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Abstract 
 
This paper summarizes recent developments in the theory and practice of monetary 
policy in a closed economy and explains what these developments mean for United States 
dollar policy.  There is no conflict between what is appropriate U.S. monetary policy at 
home or abroad because the dollar is the world’s key currency.  Both at home and abroad, 
the main problem for U.S. policymakers is to provide an anchor for the dollar.  Recent 
experience in other countries suggests that a solution is evolving in the use of inflation 
targets.  
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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference, “The Fate of the Dollar,” 
held on May 5-6, 2005 by the American Institute for Economic Research in Great 
Barrington, Massachusetts.  Thanks to Walker Todd, Owen Humpage and W. Lee 
Hoskins for helpful comments.   2
Introduction:  Why Should Americans Care about the Dollar? 
People in the United States do not pay much attention to the foreign sector—at 
least relative to the amount of attention paid in other countries.  Typically, textbooks 
suggest that this is because we are not as open as other countries—defining openness as 
the size of imports and exports relative to gross domestic product (GDP).  That may be 
right, but a better explanation is that monetary policy made in the United States matters 
for other nations much more than their policy matters for the United States.  Being the 
largest economy and the key currency country, the U.S. dollar is the de facto numéraire 
for most transactions involving trade with the United States and a significant share of 
trade between other countries. 
The only times U.S. policymakers seem to care about the foreign exchange value 
of the dollar is when the dollar moves in extreme fashion:  when it falls as it did in the 
1960s and 1970s (see Mayer 1980) or, for example, when the high value of the dollar led 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker to disregard the flawed signal that he was 
receiving from the M1 target in early 1985.  
The same attitude is evident in the Fed’s resistance to inflation targeting.  There is 
an evolving consensus that central banks ought to anchor monetary policy with ongoing 
inflation targets.  Explicit inflation targets have been most useful in countries that already 
have achieved some degree of price stability.  Whether intended or accidental, the 
advantage of explicit inflation targeting seems to be that the public comes to believe that 
the target is a long-run objective.
1  Inflation targeting helps to increase credibility about 
                                                 
1 These arguments are developed more completely in Gavin (2004).   3
long-run objectives.  Outside the United States, threats to credibility are reflected most 
sharply in the foreign exchange markets.   
 
The Link between Domestic Monetary Policy and Foreign Exchange Policy 
Because the United States is the world’s key currency country, uncertainty about 
the long-run value of the dollar becomes evident to us only when it becomes extreme.  
The bond market has been an important restraint on Fed policy, but the foreign exchange 
market has not.  Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) use interest rates on indexed and 
comparable non-indexed bonds to show that macroeconomic news affects the expected 
inflation premium in long-term U.S. interest rates.  This is evidence that markets 
continually must update their expectations about what the Fed’s goal of price stability 
means in terms of the consumer price index (CPI) 10 years from now.  This effect of 
macroeconomic news on long-term inflation expectations disappeared in the United 
Kingdom in the period after 1997—after the Bank of England had enjoyed some success 
with inflation targeting and also was given the authority (previously held by the U.K. 
Treasury) to make short-run decisions about the money market interest rate.   
In Gavin (2004), I report that the individual forecasts of one- to two-years-ahead 
CPI are more dispersed in the United States and Japan than they are in the inflation-
targeting countries.  I also note that in the United States there is more disagreement 
among Fed policymakers in their forecasts of 18-months-ahead inflation than there is in 
their forecasts of real GDP.  
The appropriate U.S. foreign exchange policy also is appropriate U.S. domestic 
monetary policy.  That is, the Fed (with the consensus of Congress and the administration   4
in power) should adopt an explicit numerical objective for the long-run trend in the CPI.  
Personally, I recommend zero inflation as the target.  If the dollar is going to anchor the 
international monetary system, then, at least in principle, it should be convertible into a 
fixed-quantity basket of goods available in the United States. 
 
Inflation Targeting and the International Monetary System 
The past 25 years have seen a major advance in our understanding of how to 
manage paper currency.  Almost all of my research and experience is with closed 
economy models and issues involving domestic effects of policy.  However, what we 
have learned in that time carries with it implications about how to organize an 
international monetary system.  
Things we have learned include: 
•  The main channel for monetary transmission is the expectations channel. 
•  Operating with an interest rate instrument is a form of inflation targeting. 
•  Monetary policy can be defined as having two instruments—the long-term price 
objective and the short-term liquidity position.  
•  The class of optimal policies is characterized by credible long-run price stability, 
which eliminates a source of asset pricing bubbles and self-fulfilling deflations 
and creates flexibility for short-run policies. 
•  Inflation targeting works because the public perceives inflation targets as long-run 
objectives. 
•  Inflation targeting has been adopted in countries where governments reject using 
seigniorage to close the government budget gap and where the Phillips curve is no 
longer seen as a useful framework for making monetary policy.
2 
 
The Expectations Channel 
                                                 
2 The Phillips curve relationship may be useful in monitoring inflation pressures even if it 
is not a structural framework for policymaking. Evidence on forecasting role is mixed 
(see Stock and Watson, 2005).   5
Inflation targeting works because the expectations channel is the main mechanism 
through which central banks affect the price level and the economy.   That inflation 
targeting has been so widely adopted and apparently worked so well has been a bit of a 
surprise to the monetarists who struggled first to sell monetary targeting and then to 
explain why it did not work.  The usual explanation was simply that the central banks 
could not get control of monetary aggregates right.  
The alternative explanation is that monetary targeting was based on a mechanical 
idea and a minor channel for monetary transmission.  In this framework, the Fed would 
control the monetary base, restraining aggregate spending and ultimately controlling 
inflation.  Lags were involved between implementation of policy and observation of its 
effects at each stage, and communication of the price objective never was an important 
part of the monetarist plan being sold in the United States.  The point was for the Fed to 
get control of money.  The Monetary Control Act of 1980 revised reserve requirements in 
order to create a more direct link between the monetary base and M1.
3  Contemporaneous 
reserve requirements were adopted in early 1984 in order to release market forces that 
were meant to improve the Fed’s control over M1. 
   
                                                 
3 Monetary base consists of bank reserves held at the Federal Reserve Banks plus 
currency in circulation outside the Federal Reserve Banks.  These are the monetary 
components that the Federal Reserve completely controls.  The Federal Reserve defines 
M1 as a monetary aggregate consisting of currency in circulation outside the Treasury, 
Federal Reserve, and member banks, plus travelers checks issued by non-banks, plus 
non-federal government and non-bank demand deposits at commercial banks, plus “other 
checkable deposits” (of which the most common are negotiable order of withdrawal 
[NOW] accounts and automatic transfer service [ATS] or “sweep” accounts) at 
depository institutions, credit union share drafts, and demand deposits at thrift 
institutions.    6
On the other hand, inflation targeting has worked because central banks do not try 
to control inflation directly.  Instead, they enlist cooperating expectations.  As a Fed 
economist in the early 1980s, I was inundated with requests for inflation forecasts by 
friends, family, and neighbors.  Inflation targeting helps to reduce the guesswork 
surrounding the future inflation trend.  With inflation targeting, the central bank chooses 
the inflation trend in an open and purposeful way.  By adopting an inflation target, the 
central bank helps the public to forecast inflation accurately and to behave in a way that 
leads to that desired inflation rate.  The official debate and decision making associated 
with inflation targeting is largely absent in non-inflation targeting countries such as Japan 
and the United States. 
Germany has had the best inflation performance among the leading industrial 
nations.  Modern Germany never had an inflation target, but the Bundesbank revealed its 
inflation objective in its announcements about the assumptions underlying the 
construction of the monetary targets.  From 1974 to 1984, the inflation objective was 
based on the notion that price stability could only be achieved in stages and was 
expressed as an “unavoidable” rate of inflation.  Beginning in December 1984, and in 
every year after, the Bundesbank simply announced that the primary monetary policy 
objective was to keep the value of money stable, which was defined as a “medium-term 
price assumption of 2 percent.”
4  In a mathematical model, if one takes the December 
1984 level of the German CPI and lets it grow 2 percent every year until 1998 (when 
Germany adopted the euro), one sees that the actual CPI appears to be co-integrated with 
the CPI series implied by a 2 percent growth path.    
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion of German monetary policy, see Bernanke et al. (1999), 
chapter 4.   7
 
Interest Rate Targeting Is Inflation Targeting
5 
Inflation targeting works because central banks operate with interest rate targets.  
I doubt that inflation targeting would be successful if central banks used quantity targets 
to implement monetary policy.  This point might not seem important because no central 
bank currently operates with targets for the quantity of money.  Still, an unfortunate 
aspect of this situation is that most of our understanding of dynamic macroeconomics 
comes from thinking about models where the central bank runs policy by controlling the 
quantity of money directly. 
The use of interest rates as operating targets stabilizes inflation over short time 
horizons.  Monetary quantity targeting, on the other hand, destabilizes inflation in the 
short run.  The difference between an interest rate and a monetary aggregate policy 
instrument can be seen in the analysis of money demand.  That analysis essentially holds 
that money demand depends on scale variables like income levels and opportunity costs 
like nominal interest rates.  Increased nominal interest rates (responding to expectations 
of higher inflation) cause a short-term decrease in the demand for real money balances.  
If the central bank is fixing the amount of money growth independently (exogenously), 
the price level rises to accommodate the decline of real monetary balances held by the 
public.  Shocks to the public’s long-term inflation expectations cause the observed 
inflation rate to be highly variable relative to the rate of money growth.  But it is not just 
variable inflation expectations that cause the problem:  All shocks to income and interest 
rate are transmitted into higher price volatility if the central bank fixes the money supply. 
                                                 
5 This section draws heavily from Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2005). 
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In contrast, if the central bank uses an interest rate target in a credible inflation 
targeting regime, then the money supply will be free to adjust to economic shocks.  The 
official adoption of an inflation target communicates information about policymaker’s 
inflation objective, and the interest rate rule transmits all money demand shocks (from 
any source) into the money supply.  An important distinction is that money supply, not 
the price level, shifts to clear the money market.  As long as inflation is determined 
independently (as with the central bank’s selection of an inflation target), then a central 
bank following a nominal interest rate target for monetary policy generates a highly 
variable money growth rate in comparison with the inflation rate.   
Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2005) show that interest rate stabilization policies are 
more important than allegedly “sticky prices” for explaining the persistence of inflation.  
Many people do not realize that when the Fed switched temporarily from pure interest 
rate targeting to the non-borrowed reserve operating procedure in October 1979, observed 
variances in monthly CPI figures after the switch tended to mirror the variances of 
nominal interest rates (see Cogley and Sargent 2005).    
 
The Instruments of Monetary Policy 
To understand why inflation targeting works so well, it is useful to think about 
monetary policy as having two uncorrelated, but not independent, instruments.  One is the 
long-term price objective, and the other is the short-term liquidity position.  The two are 
not independent because, in the long run, the accumulation of reserves growth from 
setting short-run liquidity positions (from open market operations) must be consistent 
with the long-term price objective.  But the two can be uncorrelated in the short run, just   9
as tax receipts and government spending appear to be uncorrelated over short time 
horizons.  
The most important of these instruments is the long-term price objective, but it 
should almost never change.  If policy is appropriate, people will hardly be aware of it as 
a policy.  The focus will be on the short-run liquidity decisions (short-run changes in the 
federal funds target) because setting the federal funds rate target depends on incoming 
data and knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy.  In Gavin, Keen, and Pakko 
(2005), we show how the analysis of monetary policy depends on whether one views 
monetary policy as having a transitory effect on liquidity or as having a long-lasting 
effect on the inflation trend.  Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) show that unexpected 
shocks to the federal funds target have been highly persistent.  Such persistence most 
likely is caused by minor, but nearly permanent, shifts in perceptions about the Fed’s 
long-run inflation objective.   
 
The Optimal Monetary Policy Objective Is Price Stability 
To understand the role of monetary policy objectives, we leave the Arrow-Debreu 
world of complete markets and perfect information.  The role of policy objectives always 
is to eliminate the distortions caused by departures from the assumptions of a perfect 
world underlying monetary policy analysis.  In the case of costly price adjustments, the 
best thing that the central bank can do is to eliminate unnecessary changes in the price 
level.  In the consensus New Keynesian model of Woodford (2003), the optimal policy 
objective is a stable price level.     10
A credible price stability objective affects the environment in which short-run 
policy is made.  It changes the environment in two important ways.  First, it eliminates an 
important source of indeterminacy in economic models.  Whether it does so in the actual 
economy is a debatable issue, but there is no doubt that, in models, leaving the long-run 
price objective uncertain increases the likelihood of asset pricing bubbles and self-
fulfilling prophesies of deflation.  
Second, a credible long-run policy objective creates flexibility for pursuing 
alternative short-run goals.  One of the results clearly established in the literature since 
1994 is that the short-run volatility of both output and inflation can be reduced if the 
central bank is committed to a path for the price level (or, equivalently, a long-run 
inflation objective).  The only exception to this result is in models where most agents are 
backward-looking (that is, they ignore information about expected changes in policy).  
Even there, the aggregate welfare losses associated with backward-looking behavior are 
an important policy problem.  The best thing the central bank can do in this case is to 
encourage forward-looking behavior by being clear about the inflation objective and 
following systematic procedures to achieve it.   
Optimal monetary policy in an open economy is still very much a frontier issue 
for economic research.  In practice, I suspect that following inflation targeting strategies 
already has led central banks to coordinate in ways that approximate good, if not optimal, 
policies.  Inflation targeting has led countries to adopt converging targets for inflation 
that are quite low.  To the extent that they eliminate inflation in their traded goods 
sectors, they make nominal exchange rate fluctuations reflect real values.  
   11
Inflation Targeting Works 
I was somewhat surprised to learn that the general adoption of inflation targeting 
among the industrial economy central banks has given the general public the impression 
that the targeted inflation rates are long-run objectives.  One reason for this public 
assumption is the central banks’ practice of choosing the same inflation target rate year in 
and year out.  For whatever reason, inflation forecasts for all time horizons tend to 
become centered on the central bank’s target.  King (1999) argued that the Bank of 
England should be judged by looking at the average inflation rate over long periods; he 
suggested 10 years.  In practice, this would be a target for the path of the price level 
where bygones would not be bygones.  Central banks should be explaining monetary 
policy in terms of price-level paths, not inflation rates. 
Inflation targeting should not be seen as a rule for short-run behavior.  The focus 
of the literature on rules versus discretion is misguided.  There always will be discretion 
in monetary policymaking; the question is whether there are constraints on the use of 
discretion.  If the inflation target acts as a long-term objective that influences 
expectations, then it actually will increase short-run flexibility.  The objections in 
Washington, DC, to inflation targeting are based on the idea that inflation targeting is a 
rule for short-run behavior—a rule that would require the central bank to react in a 
mechanistic way to incoming news about inflation.  If this were true, I also would be 
opposed to the idea.  Inflation targeting works not because of but despite the pressure that 
it puts on central banks to react to news about inflation.  
Inflation targeting was adopted by New Zealand, Canada, and several European 
countries because they accepted the need to make monetary policy independent of fiscal   12
policy and because they rejected the Phillips curve framework.  Fiscal reform was an 
integral part of the monetary reform in New Zealand.  I also note that Governor John 
Crow of the Bank of Canada was having a terrible time bringing increases of Canadian 
CPI below 5 percent until the Ministry of Finance joined with the Bank of Canada to 
announce a series of gradually declining inflation targets.  The Canadian series of targets 
culminated in an inflation goal defined as a CPI range of 1 to 4 percent.  Inflation fell 
almost immediately to 1 percent.  The important point here is that the inflation target 
should represent a consensus policy of all the relevant government bodies. 
Inflation targeting as a long-run rule for price stability is at odds with old-
fashioned adaptive expectation models.  The decisions by New Zealand to adopt an 
inflation target and by the European countries to join the European Central Bank (and 
thus implicitly to adopt a common inflation target) were opposed largely by two groups.  
One was macroeconomists who continue, even today, to imagine that the Phillips curve is 
a legitimate framework for conducting monetary policy.  The other was a surprisingly 
resilient group of economists who continue to believe that a policy of long-run price 
stability necessarily leads to permanently high unemployment.   
 
Conclusion 
The principal modern problem in foreign exchange policy is how to create a price 
stability anchor for a paper currency.  I suggest that a solution is evolving in the use of 
inflation targets.  In its pure mathematical form, as a short-run rule for guiding daily open 
market operations with period-by-period targets, inflation targeting is a bad idea and 
performs poorly as a nominal anchor.  If, instead, inflation targeting were seen as a long-  13
run objective for the average inflation rate, it would become a predetermined path for the 
price level.  In theory, this is a great idea and is similar to the plan for a compensated 
dollar recommended by Irving Fisher nearly a century ago. 
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